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For the better part of two millennia, churchmen, scholars, jurists, soldiers and statesmen have turned to Just War theory for guidance in making ethical 
decisions about war. Indeed, Just War concepts permeate 
international law and the laws of armed conflict; it is from 
the Just War tradition that we get the principles of pro-
portionality, noncombatant immunity, and the idea that 
legitimate authorities (i.e., governments) should have a 
monopoly on the use of force.
As the readers of this journal tend to be concerned 
with moving beyond the destructiveness of the conflict 
cycle, it is appropriate to ask, “Does Just War theory have 
something to say about our efforts to mitigate the threat 
to human life and property from explosive remnants of 
war,1 as well as illicit military-style small arms and light 
weapons?” The answer is yes: Just War theory informs our 
views of weapons in or out of the hands of legitimate au-
thorities, about the ethics of how war is conducted and 
about the post-conflict context. 
Essential Just War Theory
In its strict form, Just War theory provides policy and 
moral guidance on two issues: under what conditions it 
is moral to go to war (jus ad bellum) and how violence 
can be morally employed during war (jus in bello). Early 
Just War theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, argued that 
the principled decision to use military force was based on 
three criteria: sovereign authority acting on a just cause 
with right intent. Over time, new factors—what James 
Turner Johnson has aptly called “additional prudential 
criteria”—were added to the trio: likelihood of success, 
proportionality of ends and last resort.2 
In addition to the criteria governing the resort to 
force, jus in bello suggests that wars should be waged 
with restraint, using means and tactics proportionate 
Just War Theory and Explosive 
Remnants of War
by Eric Patterson, Ph.D. [ Georgetown University ] 
For centuries, philosophers and political theorists have pondered the ethical consid-
erations of waging war. Just War theory, expounded upon by contemporary thinkers, 
addresses three ethical components of war-making: the conditions for going to war, ac-
ceptable violence during combat, and the eventual resolution and remediation of conflict. 
These issues and their overlap with humanitarian demining and small arms/light weapons 
control are examined below. 
to battlefield objectives (proportionality) that limit harm 
to civilians (discrimination or noncombatant immuni-
ty). Finally, it should be noted that a handful of contem-
porary authors argue that we should consider the moral 
context of how wars end (jus post bellum), which is an ap-
propriate focus for practitioners who concern themselves 
with the detritus of violence in the aftermath of war. 
Just War’s Questions and Action Against ERW
The issue of legitimate authority. One of the inter-
stices between explosive remnants of war and illicit small 
arms/light weapons and the Just War tradition concerns 
legitimate authority. Just War theory begins with the 
question, “Under what conditions is it just to go to war?” 
One of the answers provided by Augustine of Hippo (St. 
Augustine) and Aquinas is that, in general, legitimate au-
thorities—we call them governments today—are the only 
agents that can justifiably use force. Of course, Just War 
theory has traditionally accepted individual self-defense, 
as well as communal self-defense in unique cases such as 
genocide. Nevertheless, generally speaking, for Just War 
theory, government authorities are the only legitimate 
purveyors of force. This premise has obvious ramifications 
for the issues related to conventional weapons and explo-
sives in the developing world, such as stockpiled mines, 
ordnance and SA/LW.
A concern that many of us share is the over-abun-
dance of military-style SA/LW and other conventional 
weapons of war that are either poorly secured or be-
yond the control of government authorities in devel-
oping countries. Of course, we are not talking about 
such items as sporting or hunting rif les, which citi-
zens legally own in accordance with national laws, 
but rather the remnants of war such as the millions 
of Warsaw Pact weapons that made their way to Af-
rica through the gray and black markets during the 
1990s or the tons of explosives looted from Saddam 
Hussein’s arsenal. 
These weapons, moving clandestinely across porous 
borders in the hands of criminals and terrorists, exacerbate 
conditions of insecurity and hamper good governance 
by legitimate governments. Likewise, the availability of 
explosive material, from landmines or other sources, has 
provided the components for improvised explosive devices. 
Fragile, post-conflict governments can be hamstrung in 
their efforts to develop economically and agriculturally 
if their lands are contaminated by unexploded ordnance 
or mines. The point is that a rightly ordered, or just, 
society presupposes conditions of security guaranteed 
by legitimate authorities, but that such a guarantee is often beyond the abilities of 
modern post-conflict institutions, which are limited further by poorly trained police, 
unpaid soldiers, newborn judiciaries and fledgling civilian-government agencies.
The issue of noncombatant immunity. Just War theory asks a second question: 
“Assuming that the decision to fight a war has been made, how can battle be conduct-
ed in a way that is moral?” One element of Just War theory that answers this question 
is the principle of discrimination—distinguishing authorized military agents of states 
(e.g., soldiers and sailors) from civilians. This principle is often called noncombatant 
immunity, which has historically included women, children, the wounded, the elderly 
and the like. 
The problems we have seen in the past decade that are directly related to illicit SA/
LW include rebel armies purchasing arms on the black market, illicit weapons end-
ing up in the hands of child soldiers, and poorly secured national stockpiles being 
pilfered by criminals. Insidiously, terrorists often target civilians as “soft targets” for 
A U.N. peacekeeper from the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo examines AK-47 magazines stored in a warehouse in Beni in North Kivu. 
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suicide bombings to cause both mass casual-
ties and widespread panic. Again, the point is 
that criminals and insurgents are turning a tool 
necessary for national defense on those who are 
unsuspecting and unarmed. Sadly, legacy land-
mines—some of which have been in the ground 
for decades—do not discriminate between war-
riors and innocents, making them an addition-
al passive, yet deadly disruptor of prosperity.
The issue of ending war well. Finally, I be-
lieve that recent on Just War Theory completed 
by Bian Orend, Michael Water, and myself, pos-
es a third question: “What does an ethical end to 
war look like?” Certainly in the past decade, we 
have seen strides toward more just and dura-
ble peace agreements than ever before, such as 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegra-
tion3 efforts, South Africa’s Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, prosecutorial attempts 
against warmongers like Slobodan Milosevic, 
reconciliation processes and the like. An im-
portant component of DDR is those processes 
by which the national government asserts con-
trol over the military hardware it dispensed 
during the conflict. Government authorities 
should collect these items, professionalize the 
forces handling the weapons, safely and se-
curely stockpile them, and destroy the excess 
and obsolete items from their stocks, lest they 
become tools for renewed conflict. 
When it comes to landmines and associ-
ated ERW, establishing long-term conditions 
of peace means stewardship of land resourc-
es, including reclamation of transport links, 
water points and farmland from contamina-
With financial assistance from the U.S. State Department, Senegal has successfully collected and destroyed more than 
4,000 small arms, including MAS-36 submachine guns and MAT-49 rifles. 
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tion. This process is “ending well”: moving 
beyond the conditions from which conflict 
commenced. Furthermore, it is more often the 
case that such issues are seen as regional and 
international inhibitors to peace, so interna-
tional partnerships with foreign governments 
or nongovernmental organizations provide 
necessary assistance to ameliorate the legacies 
of conflict. This is jus post bellum.
Pragmatic International Security
This article has demonstrated that some of 
the ways we think about the destructive lega-
cies of war, such as ERW and the proliferation 
of illicit SA/LW, have roots in venerable Just 
War theory; however, the Just War tradition 
should not be thought of as merely an academ-
ic exercise. It marries real-world pragmatism 
with our hopes for security and justice.
Elsewhere I have argued that jus post 
bellum—post-conflict law, or ending war 
well—begins with political order and some-
times moves beyond mere order to justice. In 
a handful of instances, reconciliation can be 
the result.3  That is the goal many of us hope 
for when the hot war ends; however, with-
out a durable sociopolitical order—from ba-
sic safety to confidence that the land can be 
tilled and water can be drawn safely to as-
sure that the weapons of war have been safely 
stored—such security is but a fantasy. Conse-
quently, the efforts of major governments and 
nongovernmental actors in this regard are 
critical. For example, the U.S. State Depart-
ment funds efforts to secure and/or destroy 
excess and obsolete SA/LW, and has provid-
ed over US$1.3 billion to humanitarian mine 
action in the past two decades. Governments 
such as Japan, Canada and members of the 
European Union likewise contribute in order 
to promote the conditions for such security to 
take root.
The reason Just War theory has endured 
through the vicissitudes of Western history 
is because it bridges our moral ideals with 
the realities of a world characterized by 
self-interested—and often violent—power 
politics. What many do not realize is that 
Just War theory underlies many of our 
assumptions in the West, such as those 
governing proportionality and noncombatant 
immunity. Perhaps of equal importance is 
that it provides a rationale for what we can do 
to promote security around the world. 
See Endnotes Page 111
For additional references for this article, 
please visit http://tinyurl.com/krcvum.
While the news of the United Kingdom’s decision, under global pressure, to begin demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands does show a commitment to holding countries to 
the agreements set up by Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention,2,3  the lo-
cation and situation of the landmines in discussion raise the question: 
Is demanding that the Falkland-Malvinas Islands be cleared a triumph 
in international diplomacy or a break with common sense? There are 
five distinct points that need to be made about this decision.
Cost of Demining
The Falkland-Malvinas Islands clearance process will be very 
expensive. First of all, the existing mines are laid mainly on the beaches 
and in soft ground. The result is that the mines may move in the peat 
and may be affected by the tides, complicating the process. Although a 
completed feasibility study shows that clearance may be possible, there are 
clear implications for cost. The recent U.K./Argentina feasibility study, 
of which the main element was a field survey conducted by Cranfield 
University, concludes that mine clearance in the Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands is possible but will present significant technical challenges and 
risks, which include risks related to possible environmental impact.4
While the feasibility study suggests that it is possible to grade 
the problem into degrees of complexity, the report does not identi-
fy costs (nor are there significant benefits against which these costs 
Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting Ltd. ]
Under pressure from nations around the world and in compliance with Article 5, the U.K. has committed to 
demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, despite the potential cost of demining in a relatively mine-safe1 area.
should be compared). The problem caused by this absolutist position is 
that we cannot now say that the British government can clear the easiest 
of these four categories and leave the hardest. To be Article 5-compliant, 
the British government has to clear them all, thus negating much of the 
benefit of this useful study.
No Casualties in Over 20 Years
 These mines pose a minimal threat to the Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands. There have been no civilian casualties since 1982,5 and there is 
little demand for the contaminated land. The Islanders themselves have 
been very vocal in asking the British government to spend its money else-
where. Mike Summers, a member of the legislative council of the Falk-
land-Malvinas Islands government, echoes this sentiment, saying, “There 
are a lot of mines in the Falklands, but they are not that intrusive. Clearly 
there is an issue about clearance, but unless they are cleared 110 percent, 
we are not going to take the fences down anyway. If that can be done, then 
fine. If the British government was to invest money in clearing mines, 
then we would be more than happy for them to invest it in other countries. 
Our needs are not as pressing as other people’s.”5 He goes on to say, “That 
doesn’t mean that in the fullness of time we don’t want it done. But we 
would feel somewhat embarrassed if the British government spent money 
clearing mines in the Falklands if there was an opportunity to spend it in 
some other territory where there are children and adults at risk.”5
This Falklands-Malvinas Islands minefield is a sanctuary for penguins. The birds’ ground-bearing pressure is insufficient to set off the mines, and their predators are too big to 
enter the minefield.
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